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ABSTRACT
Cognitive control allows adapting our behaviour to improve performance. A
behavioural signature of cognitive control is the Gratton effect. This effect is
observed in conflict tasks and indicates smaller congruency effects after
incongruent trials than after congruent trials. Metacognitive experience may play a
role in this effect: When participants introspect on their conflict experience, the
Gratton effect follows the conflict introspection instead of the stimulus congruency.
However this Gratton effect could also be triggered by the labelling that the
introspective method implies and/or by a misperception of the stimulus conflict.
The current study investigated whether the experiential component of the
introspection is necessary to trigger cognitive control or whether labelling a trial as
conflicting or not can be sufficient. In a priming task, Gratton effects following
metacognitive conflict experience and conflict label were contrasted. Replicating
earlier reports, results showed that the metacognitive experience of conflict can
trigger a Gratton effect. However a conflict label, either generated by the
participants themselves or presented to the participants via feedback was not able
to induce cognitive control. Results are discussed in light of current theories of
cognitive control.
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In everyday life situations, we frequently need to
control and adjust our behaviour to avoid conflicting
responses. For example, when being confronted with
an unexpected detour on our daily trip home, cogni-
tive control interrupts our habitual—often automatic
—behaviour and adjusts it to the changed situation.
In the lab, one of the most prominent cognitive adap-
tation effects is the Gratton effect (Gratton, Coles, &
Donchin, 1992). The effect reflects the observation
that the influence of an irrelevant stimulus dimension
is reduced on the trial following a trial where a conflict
occurred. For example, in the Flanker task, participants
have to respond to a central target while inhibiting
flankers (e.g., <><). In this task, a congruency effect
is usually observed: Reaction times (RTs) are longer,
and the error rate is larger on incongruent trials
(<><) than on congruent trials (>>>). The Gratton
effect is the observation that a smaller congruency
effect is observed after incongruent trials than after
congruent trials. Similar cognitive adaptation effects
have been observed in other congruency tasks like
the Simon task (e.g., Notebaert & Verguts, 2011;
Stürmer, Leuthold, Soetens, Schröter, & Sommer,
2002), or the Stroop task (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004), or
in priming studies (e.g., Desender, Van Opstal, & Van
den Bussche, 2014; van Gaal, Lamme, & Ridderinkhof,
2010).
Having a clear insight into the precise circum-
stances under which such cognitive adaptations are
triggered is an important aim in the domain of cogni-
tive control. According to the seminal conflict moni-
toring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, &
Cohen, 2001), the Gratton effect originates from adap-
tation to the processing of competing responses,
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elicited by the target and the flankers. Indeed, accord-
ing to this theory, targets and flankers are automati-
cally processed in parallel, and both activate their
corresponding response. When both stimuli trigger
opposite responses, this results in competition at the
response level. This response competition is captured
by a dedicated cognitive monitoring system. Once the
conflict is detected, this monitoring system signals
another cognitive module that induces behavioural
adaptation on the subsequent trial by increasing the
attentional focus towards the target stimuli and/or
inhibiting the processing of the flanker. Both com-
ponents (detection and adaptation components)
would function in close interaction with each other:
The higher the competition detected between the
responses, the more adaptation is initiated (Kerns
et al., 2004).
This subdivision between detection and adaptation
opens the important and still debated issue of how the
adaptation system is informed about the detection of
response conflict (e.g., Alexander & Brown, 2010). The
conflict monitoring theory assumes that the presen-
tation of conflicting information in itself is sufficient
to generate competition at the response level, suffi-
cient to be picked up by the adaptation mechanism
to intervene (for review, see Carter & van Veen,
2007). Recent findings, however, suggest that
another element termed metacognitive experience
may also play an important role in informing the adap-
tation system about the presence of conflict. To
demonstrate this, Desender et al. (2014) used a
masked priming task to investigate the role of meta-
cognitive experience for conflict adaptation to occur.
For this purpose, participants were instructed to
respond to left- or right-pointing target arrows that
were preceded by prime arrows presented near the
threshold of awareness. These barely visible primes
could be congruent (pointing in same direction as
target) or incongruent (pointing in opposite direction
to target) with the target, evoking a congruency effect
(i.e., faster responses when responding to congruent
than to incongruent trials) on the target. Crucially,
after each trial, participants were asked to introspect
and label the just-experienced trial as conflicting or
not. This allowed investigating whether it was the
actual conflict presented on the screen (i.e., a prime
that points to the other direction than the target), or
the metacognitive experience of this conflict (which
could differ from the actual conflict) that was driving
the conflict adaptation mechanism. Remarkably, con-
flict adaptation (i.e., the Gratton effect) was only
observed after trials experienced as conflicting—irre-
spective of the presence of actual objective conflict.
In other words, a smaller congruency effect was
observed after congruent trials that were experienced
as conflicting than after trials experienced as not con-
flicting, regardless of the objective congruency. This
suggests that the metacognitive experience of conflict
needs to be taken into account if we want to obtain a
better insight in how our cognitive system optimizes
our behaviour in conflicting situations. Note that, in
the study of Desender et al. (2014), besides metacog-
nitive experience, also visibility of the primes may
have played an important role to initiate cognitive
control mechanisms. With brief and masked presen-
tation of the primes, it is possible that the participants
incorrectly perceived some primes. For instance, a
congruent prime could have been misperceived as
being an incongruent one, leading in turn to a
higher metacognitive experience of conflict. As such,
also the Gratton effect could have been triggered by
this incorrect perception instead of by the metacogni-
tive experience of conflict. The current study aims to
get a deeper understanding of the relation between
metacognitive experience of conflict and cognitive
control, by excluding any potential effect of prime
visibility.
Metacognitive experiences are the feelings partici-
pants report being aware of during the processing of a
task and task-related information (Efklides, 2008;
Flavell, 1979). Inherent to the study of metacognitive
experience is that the obtained measures are subjec-
tive in nature. Furthermore, there exists no direct
and objective way to measure the metacognitive
experience of another person (for review, see Timmer-
mans & Cleeremans, 2015). The most direct method is
to ask participants to label their experience when per-
forming a task (e.g., Desender et al., 2014; Morsella
et al., 2009; Naccache et al., 2005; Wenke, Fleming, &
Haggard, 2010). So when the metacognitive experi-
ence of another person is measured, both the subjec-
tive experience itself and the labelling of this
experience are involved in the process. This can be
problematic, particularly when the interest is to
study the influence of metacognitive experience of
conflict on cognitive control. Indeed, it is possible
that the labelling and not the metacognitive experi-
ence itself initiates cognitive control mechanisms.
Consider again the study of Desender et al. (2014)
who reported a Gratton effect depending on the
level of experienced conflict. Here, participants intro-
spected, but also labelled their experience of conflict
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after each trial, making it impossible to disentangle
whether the experience itself or the labelling as such
induced the Gratton effect. Note that experiencing
and labelling of conflict are not necessarily one and
the same process. Conflict labelling can potentially
induce a belief about the nature of the previous
experienced trial. As participants most likely trust
their own label, they would believe that the label
assigned to the previous trial truthfully reflects the
congruency of that trial, even in the absence of any
experience of conflict. The labelling of such a trial as
conflicting could be sufficient to categorize it as incon-
gruent to increase cognitive control.
Although the role of labelling has not been studied
in the context of conflict adaptation, it has already
been investigated in studies looking at the influence
of error-related feedback. Cognitive control and
behavioural adaptations are observed after people
make mistakes. A typical observation is post-error
slowing—that is, the finding that RTs increase after
an error is made (Rabbitt, 1967). The general interpret-
ation of post-error slowing is that participants adopt a
more careful strategy (i.e., slower RTs) to avoid making
similar errors again (Botvinick et al., 2001). Notebaert
et al. (2009) varied the perceptual discriminability of
the targets such that participants were not always
able to experience themselves whether the given
response was correct or not. Correct feedback about
the accuracy of the response was provided after
each trial. Importantly, slowing was observed in line
with the feedback label, regardless of whether partici-
pants could experience the accuracy of their response
or not. Apparently, participants relied on the feedback
label to initiate adaptive behaviour (e.g., to slow
down). Given that Gratton effects and post-error
slowing are believed to rely on (partly) dissociable
mechanisms (Notebaert & Verguts, 2011), it remains
to be investigated whether and how these findings
observed for post-error slowing generalize to the
Gratton effect.
In summary, the main goal of our study is to
observe whether the experiential component of the
introspection is necessary to trigger cognitive
control or whether a label in itself can be sufficient.
In two experiments, a masked priming task with
arrows is presented to the participants. As in the
study of Desender et al. (2014) we investigate
whether the Gratton effect is observed in relation to
the metacognitively experienced conflict. Two new
features were introduced. First, in order not to con-
taminate the metacognitive experience of conflict
with erroneous visibility of the primes, we introduced
“lure” trials: Even though participants believe they are
looking at both primes and targets, on lure trials only
targets are presented. As such, metacognitive experi-
ences cannot originate from incorrect prime percep-
tion. Second, in parallel to post-error slowing, we
explored whether the Gratton effect could be
observed in the absence of a metacognitive experi-
ence of conflict but with a feedback label. In Exper-
iment 1, a random feedback label was presented on
the screen indicating whether the trial contained con-
flict or not. In Experiment 2, participants themselves
randomly labelled trials as conflicting or not.
Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we started from the masked priming
design of Desender et al. (2014). A prime arrow was
followed by a target arrow. Participants had to
respond to the direction of the target. Two different
conditions were created. In the first condition, the
label condition, the computer provided an external
label after each trial. This label indicated the presence
or the absence of conflict. In the second condition,
the experience condition, participants had to indicate
themselves whether they thought the trial was con-
flicting or not. In both conditions, on half of the
trials, both primes and targets were presented creat-
ing the standard congruency effect. Crucially, on the
other half of the trials, only the target arrows but no
primes were presented. The absence of objective
congruency on these lure trials enables us to investi-
gate whether labelling (Condition 1: label condition)
and metacognitive experience (Condition 2: experi-
ence condition) can induce cognitive control in the
absence of objective stimulus congruency. Impor-
tantly, in both conditions these lure trials were intro-
duced as containing a subliminally presented prime.
In the label condition, participants received a correct
label after real prime trials but a randomly chosen
“conflict” or “no conflict” label after lure trials. In
the experience condition, participants labelled the
lure trials themselves as conflicting or not. The obser-
vation of a Gratton effect after lure trials depending
on the metacognitive experience would demonstrate
that actual conflict is not necessary to induce cogni-
tive control. The observation of a Gratton effect
depending on the external label would demonstrate
that a conflict label can be sufficient to induce cogni-
tive control.
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Method
Participants
Forty-six healthy students (7 men; Mage = 18.82 years,
SD = 1.52) participated for course credits. All partici-
pants were naive to the purpose of the experiment.
Material
Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch LCD monitor
(screen resolution: 1280 × 1024 pixels) synchronized
with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. All stimuli where pre-
sented in white on a black screen and were con-
structed similar to the study of Desender and
colleagues (2014, Experiment 1). Stimuli were white
arrows (1.5° wide and 1.1° high) pointing to the left
or to the right. Masks were rectangles (2.9° × 1.5°)
filled with randomly selected grey, white, and black
pixels. The external labels in the first condition were
the words “CONFLICT” (in French: “conflit”) and
“SAME” (in French: “même”) written in capital letters
in Calibri font, size 24. Responses were recorded
with an AZERTY keyboard (keys “w” and “n”).
Procedure
The experiment consisted of two parts. The first part,
the label condition, was presented as a learning
phase. The second part, the experience condition, was
presented as the test phase. Conditions were run in
a fixed order. In the label condition, participants were
instructed to pay attention to the external label.
They were also instructed to use this external label
to learn to subjectively “perceive” a subliminal conflict
between two successive arrows. During the sub-
sequent experience condition, participants themselves
classified the trials as conflicting or not depending
on their own metacognitive experience of conflict.
Label condition. Participants were told that two suc-
cessive arrows were presented and that they had to
indicate the direction of the second arrow as fast
and as accurately as possible. It was explained to
them that on some trials, the presentation of the
first arrow would be too fast to be consciously per-
ceived, but that the conflict label after each trial
could be used to increase their sensitivity for the
prime. Participants were not aware that on 50% of
the trials, only a target was presented (i.e., lure
trials). Half of the lure trials were randomly provided
with a “conflict” label, while the other half received a
“same” label. If a prime was presented, its duration
was short, but long enough to be consciously
perceivable on most of the trials. On these prime
trials, the label was always in agreement with the
actual conflict to make sure that the participants
believed in the accuracy of the label.
A trial began with the presentation of a fixation
cross (1000 ms) followed by the presentation of two
different masks, each lasting 33 ms. Next, a prime
arrow (in the case of congruent and incongruent
trials) or an empty screen (in the case of lure trials)
was presented for 33 ms. Two other different masks
were again presented after the prime for 33 ms
each. They were followed by a black screen lasting
33 ms. Finally a target arrow was presented for
160 ms. A 3000-ms response deadline was installed
starting from the onset of the target. Immediately fol-
lowing the response, the label was provided during
1200 ms followed by the start of the next trial (see
Figure 1).
Participants first completed a training phase of four
randomly intermixed congruent and four incongruent
trials presenting all possible combinations between
the two arrows. During this first training phase, the
prime was presented for 50 ms to make them clearly
visible and thereby to encourage that participants
trusted the label. Next, participants completed a
second training part consisting of 40 trials: 10
Figure 1. Example of incongruent trial for both conditions. A trial
began with a fixation cross (1000 ms), followed by two masks
(33 ms). Next, the prime (replaced by black screen for lure trial)
appeared (33 ms), followed by two other masks (33 ms), and by a
black screen (33 ms). Finally the target appeared (160 ms.) After the
response of the participant, a “conflict” label appeared on the
screen in the label condition, or the subjective question appeared in
the experience condition.
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congruent trials, 10 incongruent trials, 10 lure trials
with a “same” label, and 10 lure trials with a “conflict”
label. When participants made an error, an exclama-
tion mark appeared before the label for 500 ms.
After training, six experimental blocks of 60 trials
each were completed. In total, the label condition con-
sisted of 90 congruent trials, 90 incongruent trials, 90
lure trials with a “conflict” label, and 90 lure trials with
a “same” label. Because of our interest in the Gratton
effect after lure trials, the sequence of trials was
pseudo-randomized so that at least 30 trials of the
two types of lure trials (with “same” or “conflict”
label) were followed by congruent trials, 30 were fol-
lowed by incongruent trials, 15 were followed by
lure trials with the “same” label, and 15 were followed
by lure trials with a “conflict” label. The 30 remaining
transitions were randomly determined. At the end of
each experimental block, the mean RT and accuracy
score appeared on the screen.
Experience condition. The second part of the exper-
iment was presented to the participants as a test
phase to observe whether participants had learned
to perceive the conflict between the prime and the
target arrows. Trials were the same as those in the
first part of the experiment except that instead of an
external label, the following question (identical to
Desender et al., 2014) appeared at the centre of the
screen (see Figure 1): (translated from French) “Do
you think there was a conflict between the two arrows
on this trial?”. Four responses to this question were
possible: (a) “conflict”: I think there was a conflict; (b)
“Rather conflict”: I don’t know but I guess there was
a conflict; (c) “Rather same”: I don’t know but I guess
there was no conflict; or (d) “same”: I think there was
no conflict. Participants were asked to respond
based on their metacognitive experience of response
conflict, defined abstractly to the participant as the
feeling of “something strange” or “more difficult”
during their response. To avoid response interference
with the subsequent trial, participants responded
verbally. The experimenter encoded the response.
The next trial started as soon as the response was
encoded. The number of trials was the same as
those in the label condition.
At the end of the experiment, participants were
asked to explain what they believed was the aim of
the experiment. This was done to verify that partici-
pants were unaware that primes were presented on
half of the trials only.
Results
One participant reported at the end of the experiment
that he did not believe that there was a prime on each
trial. This participant was removed from the sample.
Among the other participants, 31 believed that the
experiment was related to the study of subliminal per-
ception, 12 had no idea of the goal of the study; two
participants believed that the study explored the
capacity in dual-task performance; and one final par-
ticipant believed that the study investigated the influ-
ence of the arrows on reaction times. In sum,
participants did not mention any doubt concerning
the presence of the primes.
Because the responses to the experience condition
were not homogeneously distributed across the four
categories, especially on lure trials (19 participants
used at least one of the outer categories less than
5% of trials, and the use of the intermediate categories
“rather conflict” and “rather same” varied, respectively,
between 0 to 54.0% and 0 to 81.6% of trials across the
participants), they were regrouped in two categories:
“Conflict” and “rather conflict” were considered as
“conflict” trials, and “same” and “rather same” trials
were considered as “same”. The data of one partici-
pant were not considered because he/she rarely
experienced a conflict on lure trials, resulting in
several empty cells when all factors of the experimen-
tal design were crossed (see below). On average, par-
ticipants classified 36.55% (SD = 15.73) of lure trials as
conflict trials. Of the trials with a real prime, 98.39%
(SD = 3.57) were classified in agreement with the
prime.
The first trial of each block and trials following an
error or an omission were excluded from the analyses
(i.e., 3.81% in the label condition; 2.41% in the experi-
ence condition) because of sequential effects induced
by errors (Rabbitt, 1967).
Reaction times
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA)
with condition (2: label/experience), current con-
gruency (2: congruent/incongruent), previous label/
experience (2: same/ conflict), and previous trial type
(2: real prime previous trial/lure previous trial) was per-
formed on the correct mean RTs of trials with actual
prime. Trials with a real prime on the previous trial
but experienced in disagreement with this prime
(i.e., congruent trials experienced as “conflict” and
conversely) were not considered because they were
extremely rare (0.49%).
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There was a significant effect of condition, F(1, 43)
= 44.70, MSE = 16,935.74, p≤ .001, h2p = .51. Partici-
pants were slower in the experience condition than in
the label condition (505 ms vs. 439 ms). There was
also a main effect of the previous label/experience, F
(1, 43) = 13.29, MSE = 1473.88, p≤ .001, h2p = .24,
showing that participants were slower after a “conflict”
label/experience than after a “same” label/experience
(477 ms vs. 467 ms). The two-way interaction between
condition and previous trial type, F(1, 43) = 6.76, MSE =
1634.84, p = .012, h2p = .14, and the three-way inter-
action between condition, previous trial type, and pre-
vious label/experience, F(1, 43) = 4.93, MSE = 1594.32,
p = .031, h2p = .10, revealed that in the label condition,
participants slowed down after a real prime trial
(442 ms vs. 435 ms), especially when it was a “conflict”
trial (454 ms vs. 431 ms). The congruency effect was
significant, F(1, 43) = 267.79, MSE = 8269.69, p≤ .001,
h2p = .86, with slower responses on incongruent than
on congruent trials (528 ms vs. 416 ms). This con-
gruency effect interacted with condition, F(1, 43) =
242.44, MSE = 2889.19, p≤ .001, h2p = .34. The con-
gruency effect was larger in the experience condition
than in the label condition (congruency effect:
131 ms vs. 93 ms). The congruency effect was also
larger after a lure trial than after a real prime trial (con-
gruency effect: 123 vs. 101 ms), F(1, 43) = 30.16, MSE =
688.77, p≤ .001, h2p = .41. Importantly, the interaction
between the previous label/experience and the
current congruency was significant, F(1, 43) = 43.04,
MSE = 1727.25, p≤ .001, h2p = .50, suggesting the pres-
ence of a Gratton effect. However, this interaction was
modulated by several higher order interactions. There
was a three-way interaction involving previous label/
experience, current congruency, and previous trial type,
F(1, 43) = 28.335, MSE = 2332.97, p≤ .001, h2p = .40.
Also the three-way interaction between condition, pre-
vious label/experience, and current congruency was
significant, F(1, 43) = 4.57, MSE = 1193.90, p = .038,
h2p = .10. Finally, the four-way interaction between
condition, previous label/experience, current con-
gruency, and previous trial type, F(1, 43) = 4.27, MSE =
1271.25, p = .045, h2p = .09, reached significance as
well. To get a clear view on these interactions,
planned comparisons were performed to assess the
presence of the Gratton effect in each condition
after a lure or after a real prime trial. The three-way
interactions between previous label/experience,
current congruency, and previous trial type were signifi-
cant in both the label condition, F(1, 43) = 21.93,MSE =
763.61, p≤ .001, h2p = .34, and the experience condition,
F(1, 43) = 19.21, MSE = 2840.62, p≤ .001, h2p = .31. As
can be seen in Figure 2, this indicates that the
Gratton effect was observed following real prime
trials both in the label condition, F(1, 43) = 24.72,
MSE = 1474.35, p≤ .001, h2p = .37, and in the experience
condition, F(1, 43) = 31.45, MSE = 3642.51, p≤ .001, h2p
= .42. Even though present in both, this Gratton effect
was stronger in the experience condition than in the
label condition (102 ms vs. 58 ms).
Conversely, as can be seen in Figure 2, the Gratton
effect was not observed after lure trials, neither in the
label condition, F(1, 43) = 0.157, MSE = 394.44, p = .694,
nor in the experience condition, F(1, 43) = 0.06, MSE =
1014.08, p = .801, with both conditions not differing
from each other, F(1, 43) = 0.0004, MSE = 570.25, p
= .995. A Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA using
JASP-software (Version 0.7.1.12) with condition, pre-
vious label/experience, and current congruency as inde-
pendent factors on correct RT of trials was performed
to further establish the absence of the Gratton effect
after lure trials. The inclusion Bayes factor associated
with the two-way interaction between the previous
label/experience and the current congruency (.086)
and the inclusion Bayes factor associated with the
three-way interaction between condition, previous
label/experience, and current congruency (.026) were
both below the standard threshold of .33. This analysis
provided evidence for an absence of the Gratton
effect after lure as well as an absence of difference
between the experience condition and the label con-
dition after lure trials.
In sum, a Gratton effect was observed after real
prime trials in both the experience and the label con-
dition. On the other hand, the Gratton effect was not
observed after lure trials.
Error rate
There was a ceiling effect on congruent trials: Partici-
pants were correct on 99.47% (SD = 1.22%) and
99.87% (SD = 0.36%) in the experience condition and
label condition, respectively. Because of this ceiling
effect on congruent trials, we decided not to further
analyse the Gratton effect on the error rates. Indeed,
as performance can no longer improve on congruent
trials, a Gratton effect could be artificially caused by a
main effect of label presented on the previous trial. We
still analysed the error rates but only for the incongru-
ent trials. We conducted a repeated measures ANOVA
with condition (2: label/experience), previous label/
experience (2: same/conflict), and previous trial type
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(2: real prime previous trial/lure previous trial) on the
error rate of trials with actual prime.
There was a main effect of the condition, F(1, 43) =
11.06, MSE = 155.88, p = .002, h2p = .20. Participants
made fewer errors in the experience condition
(7.90%) than in the label condition (12.32%). The
main effect of the previous label/experience was also
significant, F(1, 43) = 40.12, MSE = 85.87, p ≤ .001,
h2p = .48. Participants made fewer errors after a “con-
flict” label/experience (6.98%) than after a “same”
label/experience (13.24%). Importantly, the two-way
interaction between previous label/experience and
previous trial type was significant, F(1, 43) = 29.62,
MSE = 66.10, p ≤ .001, h2p = .41. This interaction
showed that the decrease of the error rate after a
“conflict” label/experience was observed after real
prime trials, F(1, 43) = 50.53, MSE = 8.95, p < .0401,
h2p = .54, but not after lure trials, F(1, 43) = 2.21, MSE
= 47.11, p = .144. The three-way interaction was mar-
ginal, F(1, 43) = 3.53, MSE = 54.67, p = .067, h2p = .08.
Planned comparisons revealed that the decrease in
errors after “conflict” real prime trials was larger in
the label condition than in the experience condition
(13.59% vs. 8.96%), F(1, 43) = 4.44, MSE = 67.91, p
= .040, h2p = .09. As for the reaction times, no differ-
ence was observed after lure trials, F(1, 43) = 0.22,
MSE = 23.61, p = .641: No effect of the previous label/
experience was observed regardless the conditions,
label condition, F(1, 43) = 0.99, MSE = 31.69, p = .325;
experience condition, F(1, 43) = 2.00, MSE = 39.04, p
= .165. Again, this absence of effect was confirmed
via a Bayesian repeated measures ANOVA with con-
dition and previous label/experience as independent
factors. Inclusion Bayes factor associated with the
effect of previous label/experience (.326) and the
Bayes factor associated with the two-way interaction
between condition and previous label/experience
(.260) were both below the threshold of .33. In sum,
a decrease of errors was observed after real conflict
trials in both conditions, whereas the errors remained
Figure 2. Experiment 1. Reaction times (RTs) as a function of current congruency, and previous label or experience in (A) label condition and in (B)
experience condition, after (1) real prime trials and after (2) lure trials. After real prime trials the previous label/experience corresponds to the
congruency of the previous trials. Error bars represent the standard error.
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the same after lure trials, regardless of the previous
label/experience.
Interim discussion
In Experiment 1, we investigated whether a random
label indicating the presence or absence of conflict
was sufficient to induce a Gratton effect or whether
the experiential part of the introspection was necess-
ary to trigger the effect. For this purpose, we looked
at the Gratton effect after real trials and after lure
trials receiving a “conflict” or “same” random label
(label condition) or experienced as “conflict” or
“same” by the participant (experience condition).
We did not observe any adaptation after lure trials
receiving labels in the label condition. Only after real
trials was adaptation observed. This suggests that a
random conflict label disconnected from any meta-
cognitive experience is not sufficient to induce cogni-
tive control, even when it is believed to accurately
indicate the conflicting nature of the primes. Indeed,
all participants believed that primes were always pre-
sented and correctly indicated the presence or
absence of conflict. Furthermore, given that labels
were always accurate when primes were visible,
there was no reason for the participants not to trust
the accuracy of the labels.
It seems that the absence of the Gratton effect
depending on a label could be related to recent
studies suggesting that the negative emotional
aspect experienced on incongruent trials is an impor-
tant element to trigger adaptation (for review, see
Dreisbach & Fischer, 2015). Indeed, same or conflict
labels were provided randomly after each trial. This
randomness essentially eliminated any systematic
link between possible negative emotional experiences
and the label. On the contrary, such negative
emotional aspects may have been the source of the
metacognitive judgement in the experience con-
dition. However, surprisingly, in the experience con-
dition of Experiment 1, adaptation was still not
observed depending on the previous metacognitive
experience of conflict (e.g., in contrast to Desender
et al., 2014). Note that, in Experiment 1, participants
always performed the experience condition after
having performed the label condition. During the
label condition, lure trials were randomly labelled as
conflicting or not. Consequently, the random label
most likely frequently mismatched with the metacog-
nitive experience of the participants [e.g., I thought
this was a conflict (same) trial but the label indicates
it to be a same (conflict) trial]. This may have caused
participants to distrust their own metacognitive
experience of conflict, which could explain why it
did not robustly induce adaptive behaviour in the sub-
sequent condition. To investigate this possibility, a
second experiment was conducted.
Experiment 2
In the previous experiment, the use of a random exter-
nal label condition before the experience conditionmay
have prevented participants relying on their metacog-
nitive experience. To investigate this, an exact replica-
tion of the previous experience condition was run but
changes were made to the label condition. In the
experience condition, exactly as in Experiment 1, par-
ticipants were told that a prime was presented on
each trial, but that sometimes the prime was pre-
sented too briefly to be consciously perceived.
Again, as in Experiment 1, participants were unaware
that some trials contained no primes. Finally, after
each trial, participants indicated whether they experi-
enced conflict on that given trial. Some important
changes were made to the label condition. Instead of
receiving a random label from the computer as in
Experiment 1, participants were asked to provide a
random label themselves. This time, conversely to
the experience condition, it was explicitly explained to
participants that only half of the trials would contain
a prime while the other half of the trials would be
lure trials containing no prime (e.g., If you did not per-
ceive a prime, this means that no prime was pre-
sented). On trials with a prime, participants were
asked to indicate correctly whether the trial contained
a conflict or not. On lure trials, participants were asked
to randomly label the trial as “conflict” or “same”. The
label condition was adapted in such a way for two
main reasons. First, this label condition allowed
having a very similar design to Experiment 1, with
both an experience and a label condition, while pre-
venting participants from decreasing their confidence
in their metacognitive experience because they were
aware that the label in the label condition was given
randomly. If adaptation can be triggered by metacog-
nitive experience, we expect a Gratton effect in the
experience condition. Second, this label condition
allowed extending the results from Experiment
1. Results from Experiment 1 suggested that a conflict
label, dissociated from any conflict experience, does
not trigger a Gratton effect. The label condition of
Experiment 2 allows observing whether an internally
8 L. QUESTIENNE ET AL.
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generated label (instead of a label given externally by
a computer as in Experiment 1) leads to the same
result.
Method
Participants
Twenty-five healthy students (4 men; Mage = 19.68
years, SD = 1.4) participated for course credits. All par-
ticipants were naive to the purpose of the experiment.
Material and procedure
The experience condition was a replication of the same
condition in Experiment 1. All experimental parameters
remained the same with the only difference that here
the question “Do you think there was a conflict between
the two arrows on this trial?” was changed into a two-
alternative forced-choice task. This was done because
of the observed distribution of the subjective
responses in Experiment 1 (see results of Experiment
1). During the label condition, participants were
informed that half of the trials would not contain a
prime. In that case, they were asked to randomly
attach a label (“same” or “conflict”) to the trial. Partici-
pants were asked to categorize about 50% of these no-
prime trials as “same” and 50% as “conflict”. In cases
where an actual prime was presented, participants
were asked to categorize the trial as containing a con-
flict or not, as accurate as possible. The experimental
procedure was the same as that in Experiment 1. All
participants performed both conditions. The order
was counterbalanced. Participants who began with
the experience condition were told that there was a
prime on each trial but that this prime was presented
so briefly that it could not be consciously perceived.
Before the subsequent label condition, it was explained
to participants that they had been misled. When no
prime was observed, this actually indicated that no
prime had been presented. So, in the label condition,
participants were asked to correctly label the prime
when it was perceived but to provide a random label
if the prime was not perceived (i.e., not presented). Par-
ticipants starting with the label condition were pre-
sented with identical instructions but in the reversed
order. In the first label condition they were informed
that there was no prime on half of the trials. Before
the subsequent experience condition, they were told
that they had been misled. Primes had been presented
on all trials but too briefly to be consciously perceived.
During the experience condition, participants were now
asked to try to experience the conflict associated with
these briefly presented primes. Again, at the end of the
experiment, participants were asked to explain the
goal of the experiment. This was done to verify
whether participants were unaware of the fact that
primes were presented only on half of the trials
during the experience condition.
Results
All participants indicated at the end of the study that
they believed the cover story: Eleven participants
believed that the experiment was about conscious-
ness and/or subliminal perception, and five partici-
pants had no idea of the goal of the experiment.
The others referred to several other possibilities (i.e.,
the study of the effect of the laterality, the effect of
dual task, the effect of attentional capacity and the
study of the response times). Crucially, none of the
participants indicated they doubted the presence of
primes in the experience condition.
The data of five participants were not considered
because he/she labelled or experienced lure trials as
“conflict” only rarely, resulting in several empty cells
when all factors of the experimental design were
crossed (see below).
On average, in the label condition, participants
labelled 32.28% (SD = 12.87) of lure trials as conflict
trials. Of the trials with a real prime, 90.28% (SD =
8.84) were classified in agreement with the prime. In
the experience condition, participants classified
32.04% (SD = 10.82) of lure trials as conflict trials. Of
the trials with a real prime, 91.84% (SD = 7.31) were
classified in agreement with the prime.
The first trial of each block and trials following an
error or an omission were excluded from the analyses
(i.e., 1.47% in the label condition; 1.61% in the experi-
ence condition). Because of technical problems in the
encoding of the subjective responses, some trials
were also excluded from the analyses (0.65% in the
label condition and 0.74% in the experience condition).
Reaction times
As in Experiment 1, a repeated measures ANOVA with
condition (2: label/experience), current congruency (2:
congruent/ incongruent), previous label/experience (2:
same/ conflict), and previous trial type (2: real prime
previous trial/lure previous trial) was performed on
the correct mean RTs of trials with actual prime. Trials
with a real prime on the previous trial but labelled/
experienced in disagreement with this prime (i.e., con-
gruent trials experienced as conflict or conversely)
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were not considered because of their too small
number (2.86% in the label condition; 2.43% in the
experience condition). Together with these factors, a
first ANOVA involved order of conditions as between-
subjects factor. The order of condition did not interact
with any of the effects of interest and was therefore
discarded from further analyses.
There was a main effect of the previous label/
experience, F(1, 19) = 30.71, MSE = 1448.2836,
p≤ .001, h2p = .62, indicating that participants were
slower after a “conflict” label/experience than after a
“same” label/experience (562 ms vs. 539 ms). There
was also a main effect of the previous trial type, F(1,
19) = 20.00, MSE = 1306.20, p ≤ .001, h2p = .51, indicat-
ing that participants were slower after lure trials
than after real prime trials (559 ms vs. 541 ms). The
three-way interaction between condition, previous
trial type, and previous label/experience was also sig-
nificant, F(1, 19) = 7.69, MSE = 740.00, p = .012, h2p
= .29. This interaction showed that in the experience
condition, the slowing after a “conflict” experience
was larger after a lure trial (33 ms) than after a real
prime trial (8 ms). The congruency effect was signifi-
cant, F(1, 19) = 55.85, MSE = 10,132.90, p ≤ .001, h2p
= .75. Participants were slower on incongruent trials
(592 ms) than on congruent trials (508 ms). The inter-
action between previous label/experience and current
congruency was significant, suggesting the presence
of a Gratton effect, F(1, 19) = 43.03, MSE = 645.15,
p≤ .001, h2p = .69. However, the three-way interaction
between previous label/experience, current con-
gruency, and previous type, F(1, 19) = 33.62, MSE =
682.83, p≤ .001, h2p = .65, and the four-way inter-
action, F(1, 19) = 7.00, MSE = 1156.28, p = .016, h2p
= .27, were also significant. As in Experiment 1,
planned comparisons were performed to analyse
these interactions and to be able to assess the pres-
ence of the Gratton effect in each condition after a
real prime trial or after a lure trial.
In the label condition, the three-way interaction
between previous label/experience, current congruency,
and previous trial type was significant, F(1, 19) = 41.87,
MSE = 709.14, p≤ .001, h2p = .69. As can be seen in
Figure 3, the Gratton effect was significant after real
prime trials, F(1, 19) = 49.37, MSE = 815.73, p≤ .001,
h2p = .72, but not after lure trials. After lure trials, a mar-
ginal interaction between the previous label/experience
and the current congruency was observed in the direc-
tion opposite to what would be expected on the basis
of the Gratton effect, F(1, 19) = 3.02, MSE = 612.49, p
= .098, h2p = .14.
In the experience condition, the three-way inter-
action between previous label/experience, current con-
gruency, and previous trial type was not significant, F
(1, 19) = 1.80, MSE = 1129.97, p = .195. As can been
seen in Figure 3, the Gratton effect was observed
both after real prime trials, F(1, 19) = 8.76, MSE =
1636.15, p = .008, h2p = .32, and after lure trials, F(1,
19) = 6.21, MSE = 503.20, p = .022, h2p = .25. The con-
gruency effect was smaller after a real “conflict” trial
(47 ms vs. 101 ms), but also after a lure trials experi-
enced as “conflict” (65 ms vs. 90 ms). To assess more
directly the absence of the difference between the
Gratton effect after real prime trials and after lure
trials in the experience condition, we conducted a Baye-
sian repeated measures ANOVA with previous label/
experience, current congruency, and previous trial type
as independent factors on correct RT of trials in the
experience condition using JASP-software (Version
0.7.1.12). The inclusion Bayes factor associated with
the three-way interaction was .457. While this Bayes
factor inferior to 1 suggested more evidence for an
absence of difference in the Gratton effect observed
after real prime trials and lure trials, it was not below
the standard threshold of .33. Thus, we cannot affirm
with enough confidence that both Gratton effects,
observed after real prime trials or after lure trials,
were equivalent.
In sum, in the label condition, a Gratton effect was
observed after real prime trials but not after lure
trials. In the experience condition, a Gratton effect
was observed both after real prime trials and after
lure trials. No difference was observed between the
Gratton effect observed after real prime trials and
that after lure trials, but there was not enough evi-
dence to conclude that both Gratton effects were
identical.
Error rates
As in Experiment 1, there was a ceiling effect on con-
gruent trials: Accuracy rate was 99.59% (SD = 0.78) in
the label condition, and 99.63% (SD = 0.92) in the
experience condition. Therefore, only the error rates
for incongruent trials were analysed. We conducted
a repeated measures ANOVA with condition (2: label/
experience), previous label/experience (2: same/con-
flict), and previous trial type (2: real prime previous
trial/lure previous trial) on the error rates of incongru-
ent trials.
There was only a main effect of the previous label/
experience, F(1, 19) = 14.83, MSE = 28.96, p = .001, h2p
= .44. Participants made more errors after a “conflict”
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label/experience than after a “same” label/experience
(5.11% vs. 1.83%). Other effects and interactions were
not significant (all confirmed using inclusion Bayes
factors < .33).
In sum, a decreased error rate was observed after
“conflict” trials in all conditions regardless of the pre-
vious trial type.
Supplementary analysis
In Experiment 1, the Gratton effect was observed only
after real prime trials. We suggested that the label con-
dition, always performed before the experience con-
dition, could decrease participants’ confidence in
their metacognitive experience. This would lead the
participant to not use this experience to adapt after
lure trials. To prevent this problem in Experiment 2,
we changed the task context of the experience con-
dition. We expected a difference between both exper-
iments at the level of the Gratton effect observed after
lure trials in each experience condition. Conversely to
Experiment 1, the results of Experiment 2 indicated
that a Gratton effect was observed both after real
prime trials and after lure trials. We directly tested
the significance of the difference between both experi-
ence conditions of both experiments. We computed
the difference between the Gratton effect after real
prime trials and after lure trials in each experiment
and performed a one-tailed independent sample t
test on this difference between experiments. Impor-
tantly the difference between both experiments was
significant, t(62) = 1.94, p = .029, d = 0.52.
Interim discussion
In the experience condition, a Gratton effect was
observed when participants experienced conflict on
the previous trials even if no prime was presented
on that previous trial. This suggests that objective
Figure 3. Experiment 2. Reaction times (RTs) as a function of current congruency, and previous label or experience in (A) label condition and in (B)
experience condition, after (1) real prime trials and after (2) lure trials. After real prime trials the previous label/experience corresponds to the
congruency of the previous trials. Error bars represent the standard error.
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conflict is not necessary to observe cognitive adap-
tation and that a subjective feeling of conflict in
itself can be sufficient to induce cognitive control.
The results did not show any difference between the
Gratton effect triggered by real conflict trials and the
Gratton effect triggered solely on the basis of meta-
cognitive experience of conflict. This does not necess-
arily mean that both effects are really similar and that
metacognition is the driving force of all sorts of adap-
tation. However, our results do imply that objective
conflict is not necessary to induce cognitive adap-
tation. As in Experiment 1, results of the label condition
demonstrate that merely the labelling of a trial is not
sufficient to induce cognitive control. If a trial is
labelled as conflicting but this label is not associated
with the experience of a conflict, no adaptation
occurs. The experiential part of the introspection
appears to be a necessary condition for behavioural
adaptation.
General discussion
The main goal of this study was to get a deeper under-
standing of the relation between metacognitive
experience of conflict and cognitive control, without
the possible confound of prime visibility. We more
specifically wanted to observe whether a metacogni-
tive experience of conflict is needed to trigger cogni-
tive adaptation or whether a conflict label (self-
generated or through feedback) in itself can be suffi-
cient. The possible confound of prime visibility was
removed by introducing lure trials, trials where no
prime but only a target was presented. These lure
trials were either randomly labelled by the computer
(Experiment 1) or labelled by the participants them-
selves (Experiment 2) or evaluated by the participants
according to their metacognitive experience of con-
flict (Experiments 1 and 2). Note that to make some
of the conditions possible, participants were deceived:
Most of the time, they were told that there was a
prime even on lure trials. The impossibility to objec-
tively check that participants believed in that story
remains a limit of the design. However, the explicit
subjective reports of the participants and the pattern
of results made us confident that participants believed
it.
Cognitive adaptation related to the metacognitive
experience of conflict was observed in Experiment 2
but not in Experiment 1. Conflict labels, on the other
hand, never resulted in cognitive adaptation. Even
though participants believed that the feedback
labels accurately reflected the presence or absence
of conflict, this information did not induce a Gratton
effect (Experiment 1). Similarly, when participants ran-
domly labelled lure trials themselves as conflicting or
not, this did not result in a Gratton effect (Experiment
2).
In Experiment 2, the Gratton effect could be related
to the metacognitive experience reported on the pre-
vious trial. In other words, if the previous trial was a
lure trial but associated with a metacognitive experi-
ence of conflict, then a smaller congruency effect
was observed in the reaction times on the next trial.
As explained above, in Experiment 1, participants
made their metacognitive experience judgments
after having performed a condition where feedback
was given to lure trials indicating whether the just-
experienced trial contained conflict or not. Given
that this feedback was random, it frequently mis-
matched with the metacognitive experience of the
participants. As a result, participants probably
learned not to trust their own metacognitive experi-
ence of conflict. When this learning factor was
removed from the design in Experiment 2, cognitive
adaptation related to the metacognitive experience
was observed, as in Desender et al. (2014). It thus
seems important that the task context allows partici-
pants to trust their metacognitive experience to
install cognitive adaptation. While we believe that
trust or distrust in metacognitive experience provides
a plausible explanation, further systematic research of
this topic is clearly needed.
The current results extend those obtained in a pre-
vious study (Desender et al., 2014), by demonstrating
that the presence of objective stimulus congruency is
not needed to observe cognitive adaptation. We do
not deny that the presence of an objective stimulus
congruency could still have a specific influence on
adaptation, but it does not seem to be a necessity.
We demonstrate that the metacognitive experience
of conflict by itself can be sufficient to initiate adaptive
control. Additionally, because primes were absent in
lure trials, this also directly demonstrates that the
effect cannot be driven by an incorrect visual percep-
tion of the prime. While a (trusted) metacognitive
experience of conflict can be sufficient to induce cog-
nitive control, this seems not to be the case for conflict
labels. For labels it does not seem to matter whether
they are presented via external feedback (Experiment
1) or whether they are generated internally by the par-
ticipants themselves (Experiment 2). Furthermore, in
the first experiment, participants believed that the
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feedback labels were correctly indicating the presence
or absence of conflict. In contrast, in the second exper-
iment participants were asked to randomly assign
conflict labels to trials, knowing that no prime had
been presented. Regardless of whether participants
believed the accuracy of the label or not, conflict
adaptation was not observed. In sum, regardless of
whether a label is provided externally or generated
internally, or is believed by the participants or not,
conflict labels do not seem able to induce cognitive
adaptation.
For a few years, researchers have been interested in
the role of awareness for cognitive adaptation (e.g.,
can the Gratton effect be observed, even if partici-
pants are unaware about the objective presence of
conflict? For review, see Desender & Van den
Bussche, 2012). Using subliminal stimuli to induce
unconscious conflict, most studies did not find any
adaptation when participants were unaware of con-
flict objectively presented on the screen (e.g., Frings
& Wentura, 2008; Kunde, 2003). This led researchers
to conclude that conflict adaptation is initiated only
when participants are conscious about the objective
conflict, and adaptation would thus be the result of
an intention-mediated strategy (Kunde, 2003). More
recently, however, adaptation was also observed in
situations where participants were unaware of the
presence of the objective conflict presented on the
screen (van Gaal et al., 2010), thereby refuting the
idea that intention-mediated strategies are needed
to induce cognitive adaptation. Desender and col-
leagues (Desender, Van Opstal, Hughes, & Van den
Bussche, 2016; Desender et al., 2014) showed that par-
ticipants could have a metacognitive experience of
conflict, even on subliminal stimulus conflict. In a
priming task, participants were not able to consciously
perceive the primes causing the conflict, but they still
reported a larger metacognitive experience of conflict
on incongruent trials, based on a general feeling of
something “more difficult” or something “strange”. In
this case, conflict adaptation could again be inter-
preted as being a strategic adaptation, this time not
based on awareness of the objective stimulus conflict
presented on the screen, but instead based on the
subjective feeling of conflict (i.e., the metacognitive
experience). The current study confirms but also
refines this hypothesis. Results in the label condition
of Experiment 1 show that mere conflict awareness
is not sufficient to trigger adaptation. In this condition,
participants believed that the conflict label provided
by the computer truthfully reflected the conflict
nature of the stimulus, and this independent of their
own experience. However, adaptation was not
observed. Seemingly, conflict needs to be metacogni-
tively experienced before adaptation is triggered.
In its original conception, the conflict monitoring
theory (Botvinick et al., 2001) suggested that the start-
ing point of conflict adaptation is the detection of
response conflict. At that moment, the model did
not take the metacognitive experience into account.
More recently, to accommodate results coming from
the field of decision making, an extension of the con-
flict monitoring theory was proposed (Botvinick,
2007). Different results indicated that the anterior cin-
gulate cortex (ACC) was not a structure for the detec-
tion of conflict (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001), but rather a
structure evaluating action outcomes to guide
decision making (e.g., Gehring & Willoughby, 2002;
Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, Holroyd,
Schurger, & Cohen, 2004). Reconciling these two per-
spectives, it was suggested that the ACC would
detect the aversive aspect of the conflict, biasing the
action towards strategies that decrease the re-occur-
rence of this aversive event (Botvinick, 2007). Render-
ing this hypothesis plausible, recent studies
demonstrated that response conflict is indeed per-
ceived as an aversive event (Dreisbach & Fischer,
2012; Fritz & Dreisbach, 2013) and that aversive
events, dissociated from the conflict itself, could
trigger adaptation (for review, see Dreisbach &
Fischer, 2015). Additional support to emotional foun-
dations of cognitive control was provided by Inzlicht,
Bartholow, and Hirsh (2015), who reviewed conver-
ging evidences coming from cybernetics, animal
research, cognitive neuroscience, and social and per-
sonality psychology, showing that emotion is an
essential component of cognitive control. Emotion
would act as a signal to adapt goal-directed beha-
viours. Such a framework could explain why metacog-
nitive experience is able to trigger conflict adaptation.
The metacognitive experience of conflict could be
exactly this, an aversive signal to adapt behaviour
(see Damasio, 1999, for a theory on the relations
between emotion, feeling, and experience). This
would also explain why a mere labelling has no influ-
ence, even when it is believed to reflect the conflicting
nature of the stimulus. If a label is not experienced as
an aversive signal, it would not trigger cognitive
control mechanisms.
The exact origin of the metacognitive experience of
conflict and its potential associated aversive effect
remains an open issue. The aversive account of
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cognitive control suggests that the aversive affect
originates from the conflict triggered by the stimulus
congruency (for review, see Inzlicht et al., 2015). Incon-
gruent trials would be processed less fluently (e.g., see
Dreisbach & Fischer, 2011), would require an increased
effort to be resolved (e.g., see Song & Schwarz, 2008),
or would trigger a negative effect more directly. In the
current study, however, participants reported an
experience of conflict on trials where objective conflict
was completely absent (i.e., lure trials where no prime
was presented). In other words, it is impossible that
objective congruency induced the experience of
conflict.
Another possibility is that response conflict
occurred on neutral trials for undetermined reasons,
leading to the experience of conflict (Abrahamse &
Braem, 2015; Desender et al., 2014; Yeung, Cohen, &
Botvinick, 2011). One such undetermined reason
could be the violation of expectancies: I expected a
left hand response but instead, I had to press on the
right side. As a result, co-activation of incompatible
motor actions could occur even on lure trials. This
could explain why participants sometimes reported
an experience of conflict on these lure trials. This
hypothesis was already suggested by Desender et al.
(2014) to explain why a feeling of conflict was
reported on congruent trials. Importantly, if response
conflict is the cause of the metacognitive experience
of conflict, this hypothesis could be used to argue
that the relation between metacognitive experience
and the Gratton effect is not necessarily causal (Abra-
hamse & Braem, 2015). If a metacognitive experience
of conflict arises from the occurrence of a response
conflict, mere response conflict could be the source
of the Gratton effect, as it was proposed in the original
version of the conflict monitoring theory. The meta-
cognitive experience of conflict would be merely epi-
phenomenal, just as the conflict monitoring theory
(Botvinick et al., 2001) would suggest. However, it is
more difficult to imagine why undetermined factors
like expectancies would differ between our two exper-
iments. Indeed, if the undetermined factors were the
same across both experiments, it is not easy to
explain why cognitive adaptation was observed as a
function of metacognitive experience in Experiment
2 but not in Experiment 1. Even though speculative,
this combination of results seems to favour the idea
that it is the metacognitive experience of conflict in
itself that has a specific effect on the Gratton effect.
A third possible source of the metacognitive
experience of conflict on lure trials can be identified.1
It is possible that the reported experience of conflict is
the read-out of an increased level of difficulty occur-
ring during the inter-stimulus interval of lure trials.
During this interval, participants are asked to indicate
whether they perceived conflict or not. On lure trials
this is relatively difficult if compared to trials where
an actual prime was presented. As such, it is theoreti-
cally possible that the reported experience of conflict
reflected this level of difficulty.
In sum, we observed that the presence of objective
stimulus conflict is not necessary to induce cognitive
adaptation: Metacognitive experience of conflict in
itself can be sufficient to trigger a Gratton effect. The
main contribution of our study is that we showed
that the experiential part of the introspection is a
necessary component to trigger this Gratton effect.
Neither the labelling of the trials nor the beliefs
about the conflicting nature of the trials was sufficient
to induce adaptation.
Note
1. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing us to this
possibility.
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